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CHAPTER 1B 
The Post-TARP Movement 
to Regulate Banker Pay 
ERIC D. CHASON 






DODD-FRANK'S UNFOCUSED COMPENSATION REFORMS 
[1] Corporate Governance Reforms of General Application 
[2] FDIC Clawback Authority 
[3] Regulation at Covered Financial Institutions 
THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (FSB) 
[1] The Cooperative Model of International Financial Regulation 
[2] FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices 
[a] The Risk-Management Criticism of Incentive Compensation 
[b] Alignment of Incentive Compensation with Risk Management 
[c] Governance by Boards, Regulators, and Stakeholders 
[3] FSB Implementation Standards 
[4] U.S. and E.U. Implementation of Compensation Reform 
§ 1B.04 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
§ lB.Ol INTRODUCTION 
Despite the state-law origins of corporate law, the federal government has attempted 
to regulate executive compensation for decades. 1 Before the financial crisis, however, 
1 See Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Federal Attempts to Curb 
lB-1 (Rei. 2011-10/2011 Pub.1646) 
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these attempts were largely indirect and implemented through the tax and securities 
laws. The Internal Revenue Code favored some arrangements (e.g., stock options) 
while disfavoring others (e.g., large fixed salaries) in order to encourage higher levels 
of executive performance. Using its regulatory power, the Securities Exchange 
Commission required disclosure of executive pay packages. The SEC remained 
facially neutral about different types of arrangements, but was clearly motivated by the 
idea that public disclosure would curtail executive pay. 2 
Financial firms were, however, singled out and subject to pay caps during the crisis 
and ensuing bailouts. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) limited the amount 
of compensation that TARP recipients could pay and subjected their pay practices to 
regulatory oversight by a new "pay czar," Kenneth Feinberg. 3 The TARP limits ceased 
to apply once firms repaid their assistance, which most recipient firms have now done. 4 
Because of the outrage over the crisis and the extravagance of financial-sector 
compensation, it was inevitable that policymakers would seek more permanent 
regulation of banker pay. 
§ 1B.02 DODD-FRANK'S UNFOCUSED COMPENSATION REFORMS 
Just as the collapse of Enron gave birth to Sarbanes-Oxley, the financial crisis 
spawned its own signature legislation, Dodd-Frank. 5 The act is enormous in scope and 
size, running nearly 850 pages in the Statutes at Large6 and reforming financial 
regulation of gargantuan bank holding companies7 down to pawn shops and payday 
lenders.8 
[1] Corporate Governance Reforms of General Application 
Given the widely held view (even inside the industry) that compensation practices 
played some role in the crisis, one would have expected Congress to devote 
Perceived Abuses, 10 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 196, 222 (2010). 
2 See id. 
3 See MichaelS. Melbinger, Executive Compensation & Risk, 14 N.C. BANK. INST. 59 (2010); John 
W. Lee, Tax TARP Needed for Year One and Year Two Returns of Executive Bonus to TARP Recipient: 
A Case Study of Year One Rescission/Exclusion From Income and Year Two Deduction Under Section 
1341, 1 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 323 (2010). 
4 See OFFICE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: Two YEAR RETRO-
SPECTIVE (2010). 
5 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010). 
6 124 Stat. 1376-2223. 
7 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank §§ 16t-76, 124 Stat. at 1420-42. 
8 See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS 
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 107 (2010). 
(Rel. 2011-10/2011 Pub.1646) 
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considerable attention to compensation in drafting the act. Dodd-Frank, however, 
devotes a mere eight pages to compensation practices, many of which are generic 
provisions applicable to all listed companies: 
• Periodic but nonbinding shareholder advisory votes on executive 
compensation (i.e., "say on pay").9 
• Independence of compensation committees.10 
• Disclosures relating executive pay versus performance~ 11 
• Recovery of erroneously awarded executive compensation following a 
restatement of earnings (i.e., "claw-backs").12 
• Disclosure of company policies on whether executives can hedge 
against declines in equity compensation (stock or options).13 
Though some claim ulterior motives, 14 the public-spirited justification for these 
provisions argues that federal regulation is necessary to align the divergent interests of 
management and shareholders.15 Regarding claw-backs, a Committee report said, 
"The Committee believes it is unfair to shareholders for corporations to allow 
executives to retain compensation that they were awarded erroneously.''16 Similarly, 
according to the committee, hedging disclosures "will allow shareholders to know if 
executives are allowed to purchase financial instruments to effectively avoid compen-
sation restrictions that they hold stock long-term, so that they will receive their 
compensation even in the case that their firm does not perform."17 
In the financial sector, however, enhancing shareholder value does not necessarily 
enhance societal welfare. Shareholders may have the incentive to pursue excessive 
risks because neither they nor any other stakeholders bear the full costs of systemic 
9 Section 951, 124 Stat. at 1899-1900. 
10 Section 952, 124 Stat. at 1900-03. 
11 Section 953, 124 Stat. at 1903-04. 
12 Dodd-Frank§ 954, 124 Stat. at 1904; cf. also Sarbanes.,Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
§ 304(a), 116 Stat. 745, 778 (imposing clawbacks on CEOs and CFOs). 
13 Dodd-Frank § 955, 124 Stat. at 1904-05. 
14 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II 7 
(UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-12, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/ 
abstract=l673575. 
15 Se~ generally Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004). 
16 S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 133-36 (2010). 
17 /d. 
(Rei. 2011-10/2011 Pub.l646) 
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risk when bank failures rock the entire economy.18 Moreover, the government 
socializes the much of the risk of banking by providing a safety net of deposit 
insurance, emergency lending, and bailouts. Other compensation reforms of Dodd-
Frank, discussed next, aim to enhance the safety and soundness of financial firms. 
[2] · FDIC Clawback Authority 
Dodd-Frank gives regulators a powerful new tool to put large, failing financial firms 
into receivership.19 This new resolution authority was enacted primarily to avoid a 
future Lehman-an enormous financial firm going through bankruptcy proceedings 
considered by many ill-equipped to deal with such size and complexity.2° Congress 
clearly views the new resolution authority as supplanting bankruptcy and probably 
future bailouts as well. 21 Many question whether the Federal Reserve and Treasury 
Department will swear off bailouts should they consider them appropriate in the 
future.22 
As for the mechanics of the new authority, the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC 
must jointly decide to place a systemically important financial firm into resolution, 
based primarily on the determination that the firm is in default or in danger of 
default. 23 The FDIC conducts the resolution process and has broad powers in deciding 
which creditors should be paid and in what amounts. 24 Equity compensation should be 
automatically wiped out during resolution, and the FDIC would surely try to minimize 
if not repudiate payments to bankers under deferred compensation arrangements.25 
Moreover, Dodd-Frank authorizes the FDIC to recover all payments made to senior 
executives two years prior to the start of the resolution process. 26 Both the statute and 
18 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L. J. 247 
(2010). 
19 See Dodd-Frank Act§§ 201 to 217, 124 Stat. at 1442-1520. 
20 But cf SKEEL, supra note 8, at 31 ("Given the tumultuous environment in which Lehman filed its 
original bankruptcy petition, the assumption that bankruptcy must have been a disaster is perhaps 
understandable. But in fact, bankruptcy worked quite well."). 
21 Cf Dodd-Frank Act § 1, 124 Stat. at 1376 (describing the purposes of .the Act as "improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail', [and] to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts"). 
22 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, 
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 7-10 (January 26, 2011). 
23 See Dodd-Frank Act§ 203(b), 124 Stat. at 1451;SKEEL, supra note 8, at 121. 
24 See SKEEL, supra note 8, at 148. 
25 The FDIC has proposed giving such obligations a lower priority than subordinated debt. See 76 Fed. 
Reg. 16324, 16340 (March 23, 2011). 
26 Dodd-Frank Act § 210(s), 124 Stat. at 1514; cf also 12 C.P.R. § 380.3(a)(2) (defining "senior 
executive"). 
(Rel. 2011-10/2011 Pub.l646) 
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proposed regulations allow the "clawback" only when the senior executive is 
"substantially responsible" for the firm's failure.27 CEOs and CFOs are presumed 
substantially responsible but may rebut the presumption by showing they "performed 
[their] duties with the requisite degree of skill and care required."28 
[3] Regulation at Covered Financial Institutions 
Dodd-Frank Act § 957 authorizes federal regulators to regulate compensation 
structures at "covered financial institutions," a term that includes important banks 
among others. 29 Federal financial regulators have the authority to issue rules that-
prohibit any types of incentive-based payment arrangement, or any feature of any 
such arrangement, that the regulators determine encourages inappropriate risks by 
covered financial institutions-
(1) by providing an executive ··officer, employee, director, or principal 
shareholder of the covered financial institution with excessive compen-
sation, fees, or benefits; or 
(2) that could lead to material financial loss to the covered financial 
institution. 30 
In April 2011, U.S. financial regulators proposed rules implementing section 957.31 
. Because the details of these proposed rules largely come from the Financial Stability 
Board, they are discussed in more detail below. 32 
Section 957 is largely superfluous. Even before the financial crisis, U.S. bank 
regulators prohibited "excessive compensation" as an "unsafe and unsound prac-
tice. "33 Excessive compensation drains bank capital, making the bank more prone to 
distress or default. The goal of preventing excessive compensation is to protect 
depositors and the banking system, not bank shareholders. Indeed, from a regulatory 
perspective, excessive compensation is no more or less harmful than excessive 
27 See Dodd-Frank Act § 210(s)(l), 124 Stat. at 1514; 76 Fed. Reg. at 16338. 
28 76 Fed. Reg. at 16338. 
29 Dodd-Frank § 957, 124 Stat. at 1905-07. Covered financial institutions include depository 
institutions and their holding companies, broker dealers, investment advisors, credit unions, Freddie Mac, 
and Fannie Mae. Institutions with under $1 billion in assets are exempt. Dodd-Frank§ 957(e)(2), 124 Stat. 
at 1906. 
30 Dodd-Frank § 956, 124 Stat. at 1904. 
31 See § 1B.03[4]. 
32 See id. 
33 See 12 C.P.R. pt. 30 App. A (''Excessive compensation is prohibited as an unsafe and unsound 
practice."); 12 C.P.R. pt. 208 App. D-1 (same); 12 C.P.R. pt. 364 App. A (same); 12 C.P.R. pt. 570 App. 
A (same). 
(Rei. 2011-10/2011 Pub.1646) 
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dividends, as both deplete bank capital. 34 A month before Congress passed Dodd-
Frank, federal banking regulators issued guidance on compensation at regulated 
institutions. 35 Section 957 merely expands the scope of firms whose compensation is 
regulated36 while allowing regulators to rethink their manner of implementing 
international agreements discussed below. 
§ 1B.03 THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (FSB) 
[1] The Cooperative Model of International Financial Regulation 
For compensation and benefits lawyer, the movement to regulate banker pay will 
seem to be come from a strange place. Most of what U.S. and E.U. regulators have 
done is implement agreements reached by the Financial Stability Board, composed of 
central bankers and regulators from the wealthier nations and charged with developing 
policy responses to the financial crisis. 3~ International consensus is the traditional 
model for banking regulatio11. Because capital is mobile, bankers and nations have 
long sought to level the playing field between different jurisdictions. The model for the 
FSB comes from the Basel Committee on Banki..11g Supervision, 38 which describes its 
authority as follows: 
The Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority, 
and its conclusions do not, and were never intended to, have legal force. Rather, 
it formulates broad supervisory standards· and guidelines and recommends 
statements of best practice in the expectation that individual authorities will take 
steps to implement them through detailed arrangements-statutory or otherwise-
which are best suited to their own national systems. In this way, the Committee 
encourages convergence towards common approaches and common standards 
without attempting detailed harmonisation of member countries' supervisory 
techniques. 39 
34 Cf. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK: CAPITAL ACCOUNTS AND 
DIVIDENDS ("Excessive dividends can weaken a bank's capital position.). 
35 See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395 (June 25, 2010). 
36 The June 2010 guidance applies to the most important class of financial firms: banks and bank 
holding companies. See id. at 36398. Dodd-Frank § 957 extends the regulatory reach to broker dealers, 
investment advisors, credit unions, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae, while exempting institutions with 
under $1 billion in assets. See Dodd-Frank § 957(e)(2), 124 Stat. at 1906. 
37 See History, Financial Stability Board, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about!history.htm. 
38 Basel is composed of central bankers from the G-20 and a few other rich countries. The European 
Union has its own seat at the G-20 but not at Basel. The remaining nineteen nations all participate in 
Basel, as do Belgium, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and 
Switzerland: See generally History of the Basel Committee and its Membership, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ 
history .htm. 
39 See supra note 38. 
(Rei. 2011-10/2011 Pub.l646) 
I 
lB-7 REGULATING BANKER PAY § 1B.03[2][a] 
The actual Basel standards of capital regulation40 clearly fell short during the financial 
crisis, prompting newer and tougher standards. 4 1 Basel has been successful, however, 
at achieving harmonization, with most nations adopting some form of the Basel 
accords. 42 This success inspired the G20 nations to task a similar body, the Financial 
Stability Board, with responding to the financial crisis. Mostly the same countries 
comprise the FSB and the Basel Committee, although the FSB includes financial 
regulators . (like the SEC) and some nongovernmental organizations (like the IMF) in 
addition to the central bankers who meet on Basel. 43 
[2] FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices 
[a] The Risk-Management Criticism of Incentive Compensation 
Consider the following exaggerated example on risk-seeking incentives. Suppose 
you could make a bet-with your employer's money-that the stock market will rise 
next month. If you are right, your employer makes $1 billion, and you get a nice bonus 
of $10 million. If you are wrong,· your employer loses ·$1 billion, and you get fired but 
could probably land a job at a slightly lesser firm. Most people would be willing to bet 
their jobs on a multimillion-dollar·payoff. Bankers (greedy and otherwise) are different 
because they actually have the chance to do so. 
Bank executives have long understood that bonus-seeking employees could take on 
too much risk and "blow up" the firm. Rogue trader, Nick Leeson, bankrupted Barings, 
one of England's oldest and most storied banks in 1995. The 2008 counterpart 
occurred at the Financial Products Group of AIG. AIG is primarily an insurer, and its 
Financial Products group sold credit-default swap (CDS) contracts, essentially 
insurance against the default of some other financial instrument like a bond. AIG, of 
course, collected a premium for writing each CDS contract. Before the financial crisis, 
default on the underling bonds was a remote and contingent event, making the 
40 Conceptually, the Basel capital requirements limit bank leverage. Unlike traditional measures of 
leverage deployed in financial analysis, bank capital requirements reflect the riskiness of assets. Compare, 
e.g., Thomas R. Robinson et al., Financial Analysis Techniques, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
STATEMENT ANALYSIS 259, 288-91 (2009) (describing measures of solvency and leverage used in 
financial analysis) with Douglas J. Elliot, The Importance of Capital, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/ 
2010/ 0129_capital_elliott.aspx (describing bank capital). 
41 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE REsiLIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 
December 2010 (rev June 2011) 
42 See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance-And Not Trade, 13 J. Int'l 
Econ. L., Vol. 623 (2010). 
43 Compare Financial Stability Board Charter, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org /publications/ 
r_090925d.pdf (listing regulators and nations represented on FSB) with About the Basel Committee, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (listing central banks represented on Basel Committee). 
(Rel. 2011-10/2011 Pub.1646) 
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transactions appear very profitable. These profits enriched the Financial Products 
employees with average compensation of over $1 million per year, giving them every 
reason to sell more and more CDS. The employees, however, are not on the hook for 
any losses should the bonds default. Since Financial Products was a small comer of 
AIG---employing a few hundred of AIGs 100,000 employees-top executives were 
ill-equipped to control the risks presented by the CDS contracts. Once the financial 
crisis struck, only a federal bailout of $85 billion saved AIG from bankruptcy. 44 
Thus, incentive compensation gave Financial Products employees an incentive to 
pursue risk. Their returns were asymmetric: success gave the employees large bonuses, 
while failure brought widespread economic loss. Reforming such incentives has 
become the primary work of the Financial Stability Board. 
[b] Alignment of Incentive Compensation with Risk Management 
The most influential work on regulating banker pay. is the FSB's Principles for 
Sound Compensation Practices45 (the "Principles"). In the view of the FSB, incentive 
compensation contributed to the financial crisis because it was not coordinated with 
risk management. 46 The following . example illustrates this failure: 
Imagine two e1nployees whose activity" generates the same short-run profit for the 
firm. One is a trader who ends each day with no positions and thus who exposes 
the firm to losses only during the trading day. Another is an originator of 
long-term, on-balance-sheet assets that provide substantial fees at origination but 
that expose the- firm to substantial risk of loss over the life of the asset. Many 
compensation systems would tend to reward the two employees similarly, other 
things being equal, because . there would be no "risk charge" applied to the 
short-term profits generated by the second employee.47 
Risk-management systems did constrain employees before the crisis by disallowing 
some trades and projects. Risk management was about permission and limited the 
array of transactions that employees could take on behalf of their firms. Within the set 
of approved transactions, however, employee compensation was measured by profit 
without any adjustment for risk. Returning to the FSB example, assume that an 
employee receives permission to transact as either a short-term trader or a long-term 
originator. All other things being equal, the employee would pursue transactions as an 
originator as illiquid, long-term, risky transactions tend to produce higher profits. The 
44 See Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer's Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMEs, Sep. 
27, 2008. 
45 FIN. STABILITY FORUM, FSB PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES (2009) [herein-
after FSB PRINCIPLES]. 
46 FSB PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, at 1. 
47 FSB PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, at 8. 
(Rei. 20ll-l0/2011 Pub.l646) 
I 
lB-9 REGULATING BANKER PAY § 1B.03[2][b] 
Principles aim to correct this employee-level bias by requiring firms to make incentive 
compensation sensitive to risk. 
Thus, the true failure at AIG and elsewhere was that incentive compensation was not 
adjusted to reflect the risk taken on by employees. 48 The trick, however, is devising an 
effective way to do so. Quantitative models (like "value at risk" and its variants) exist 
for many transactions, allowing firms to impose upfront risk charges. These models do 
not perform well_ in times of distress, the only time they really matter. 49 Human 
judgment seems little better at predicting crisis. We need only recall the choir of 
prominent voices that, before September 2008, downplayed the impact of subprime 
mortgages, the housing collapse and credit crunch on overall economy. 50 
The soft, standards-based approach of the FSB 's Principles would seem to reflect 
these difficulties. They are flexible and sensible in the abstract. No one could seriously 
argue against propositions like "Compensation systems should link the size of the 
bonus pool to the overall performance of the firm. Employees' incentive payments 
should be linked to the contribution of the individual and business to such perfor-
mance. Bonuses should diminish or disappear in the event of poor firm, divisional or 
business unit performance. "5 1 
The Principles leave implementation up to individual firms. They can use 
quantitative methods to measure risk taking and bonuses. If these methods are found 
lacking, firms may defer bonuses or pay them in firm equity to adjust ultimate payouts 
with ultimate performance. The Principles recognize the limits of these methods, 
especially with the use of firm equity. Employees may just want to get their equity 
awards and may realize that their individual risk -taking will have little effect on overall 
firm performance. Indeed, equity (especially options) offers asymmetric returns that 
could even encourage risk -taking. 52 
We should note, however, that the goal is not to regulate compensation per se, but 
to regulate the risk of financial distress. If firms can regulate risk in alternative 
ways-for example, by holding more capital or by hedging-can they simply ignore 
compensation? The Principles answer no, 53 holding that compensation reform is 
necessary to prevent employees from manipulating the quantitative risk management. 
48 FSB PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, at 8. 
49 See generally Nicholas Nassim Taleb, THE BLACK SwAN (2007). 
5° Cf., e.g., Austan Goolsbee, 'Irresponsible' Mortgages Have Opened Doors to Many of the 
Excluded, N.Y. TIMEs, March 29, 2007 (arguing that, with subprime lending, "the mortgage market has 
become more perfect, not more irresponsible."). 
51 FSB PRINCIPLES, supra note, 47, at 3. 
52 /d. at 10-11. 
53 Id. at 8. 
(Rel. 2011-10/2011 Pub.1646) 
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Yet, if employees can exploit traditional risk management, however, surely they can 
exploit flexible standards. Perhaps the FSB believes that their Principles will actually 
change firms' cultures by ensuring that risk management affects the most salient 
measure of banker performance-compensation. 
[ c] Governance by Boards, Regulators, and Stakeholders 
The Principles envision compensation structures being overseen by boards, finan-
cial regulators, and "stakeholders" (like shareholders). Implicitly, the FSB is respond-
ing to the concern that bankers are setting their own pay without oversight from those 
constituents who will bear the consequences. 
The governance standards regulate process, not results, much like the "procedural 
prudence" required by fiduciary law. 54 Boards of directors, not management, must 
have primary control over compensation and review compensation structures regu-
larly. 55 The breadth of board oversight extends beyond executive compensation and 
reaches all employees who could affect firm risk. 56 
While boards must establish and regularly review incentive-compensation pro-
grams, they cannot actually administer them. Those who do n1ust have the appropriate 
authority, independence, and expertise. One fear is that bonus-maximizing bankers 
will cow risk-n1anagers into altering their judgments. In response, the Principles 
require that risk -control employees be independent of front office employees. 
Similarly, the Principles den1and that banks hire competent risk managers and pay 
them appropriately. 57 
In addition to the· board, regulators must review compensation. "[W]hen the totality 
of a firm's compensation practices are less than sound, supervisors should first exercise 
suasion on the affected firm, and in the absence of necessary improvement should 
consider escalation to firmer intervention, which may include increased capital 
requirements. "58 Stakeholders-shareholders, counterparties, depositors, auditors and 
analysts-should receive disclosures about firm compensation. The Principles expect 
"engagement" with stakeholders without specifying details. 59 
Like the risk-management Principles, the governance Principles are flexible, 
commonsensical, and unlikely to affect actors determined not to be affected. It is 
54 Cf Pamela D. Perdue, QUALIFIED PENSION & PROFIT SHARING PLANS !J[ 3.08[2][b] (describing 
ERISA procedural prudence). 
55 FSB PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, at 2. 
56 /d. at 6. 
57 !d. at 6. 
58 !d. at 14. 
59 !d. 
(Rel. 2011-l0/2011 Pub.l646) 
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unclear how we can even measure their effectiveness as the Principles fail to provide 
clear vision of whose interests are being safeguarded. They note that the financial crisis 
"revealed that many firms took actions that were inconsistent with their own goals and 
externally determined risk appetite. "60 Similarly, the Principles argue for more 
"oversight and engagement" by "the firm's stakeholders, particularly shareholders."61 
Elsewhere, the Principles suggest that firms follow some objectively prudent level of 
risk, referring the "excessive risk taking"62 that contributed to the financial crisis. 
There are good reasons to believe that financial regulation cannot serve both the 
interests of shareholders and society at large. Like bankers themselves, shareholders 
enjoy limited liability and asymmetric returns. They keep all the gains from risk but 
have limited exposure to losses. Because of systemic risk, society at large-not 
stakeholders-bears much if not most of the burdens.63 
[3] FSB Implementation Standards 
The Principles do not impose pay caps, nor do they require compensation to be paid 
in any particular form. 64 For the most part, they leave firms free to decide for 
themselves how to align risk management and incentive compensation, although the 
Principles do specify factors of particular concern. Six months after issuing the 
Principles, the FSB took a more stringent stance with its Implementation Standards.65 
The Implementation Standards require firms to defer between 40 and 60 percent of 
banker bonuses over at least three years. Firms may use a form of "graded vesting" to 
pay the deferred bonuses (i.e., 1/3 after one year, 1/2 of the remainder after two years, 
and the full remainder after three years). Moreover, firms must pay at least 50 percent 
of bonuses in the form of firm equity, subject to an appropriate retention policy. 66 
60 Id. at 5. 
61 ld. at 13. 
62 See Id. at 1 ("High short-term profits led to generous bonus payments to employees without 
adequate regard to the longer-term risks they imposed on their firms. These perverse incentives amplified 
the excessive risk-taking that severely threatened the global financial system."); id. ("The Principles are 
intended to reduce incentives towards excessive risk taking that may arise from the structure of 
compensation schemes."); id. at 12 ("[T]he asymmetry of bonus practice encourages taking of excessive 
risk. It also reduces the incentive to draw attention to excessive risk taking by others, since the sensitivity 
of the employee's compensation to losses caused by others is reduced."). 
63 See Steven L. Schwarz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008) (describing systemic risk as 
an externality). 
64 FSB PRINCIPLES, supra note 47, at 1 (stating that the Principles are "not intended to prescribe 
particular designs or levels of individual compensation. One size does not fit all."). 
65 FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES: IMPLEMENTATION 
STANDARDS (2009). 
66 ld. at 3. 
(Rei. 2011-10/2011 Pub.1646) 
§ 18.03[4] NYU REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 1B-12 
The Implementation Standards comprise five scant pages, only one of which is 
devoted to the deferral and firm-equity requirements. Based on the Principles, 
however, it is clear that the requirements are motivated by the idea of risk management 
and alignment. Deferred compensation is particularly well suited to ex ante adjust-
ments to reflect individual performance, although such adjustments are not expressly 
required by the Implementation Standards. At least in the U.S., deferred compensation 
takes the form of an "unsecured promise to pay," arguably giving senior management 
the incentive to avoid default at the firm level. Furthermore, equity compensation 
automatically reflects overall firm performance. 
[4] U.S. and E.U. Implementation of Compensation Reform 
U.S. and E.U. regulators have largely adopted the FSB's original Principles. Thus, 
incentive compensation must provide incentives that balance risk and reward, be 
compatible with risk management, and be supported by strong governance and 
oversight.67 Acting pursuant to its authority under Dodd-Frank, U.S. regulators have 
proposed extending their regulation of incentive compensation to bank holding 
companies, broker dealers, and certain other non-bank financial firms. 68 
The U.S. and E.U. differ, however, on their adoption of the more binding 
Implementation Standards of the FSB. The E.U. has fully adopted them (and perhaps 
gone even further). E.U. financial firms must pay substantial portions of incentive 
compensation in both deferred compensation and in employer stock (or similar 
instruments). Deferral must cover between 40% and 60% of incentive compensation 
(rising with the level of the employee), and shares must command at least 50% of 
incentive compensation. The two requirements apply separately. For an executive 
subject to 60% deferral, every €100 of incentive compensation would be paid (a) €20 
in current cash, (b) €20 of current stock, (c) €30 of deferred cash, and (d) €30 of 
deferred stock. Since the deferral and stock requirements must be satisfied indepen-
dently, an E.U. firm could pay only 20% to 25% of incentive compensation in current 
cash.69 
In contrast, U.S. regulators have watered down the Implementation Standards,7° 
· 
67 See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 70 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36405 (June 25, 
2010); COMM. OF EURO. BANK SUPERVISORS; GUIDELINES ON REMUNERATION POLICIES AND PRACTICE · 
(2010). 
68 See Dodd-Frank Act§ 956, 124 Stat. at 1905-07; Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 
Fed. Reg. 21170 (Apr. 14, 2011). 
69 See generally Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Economics, Politics, and the 
International Principles for Sound Compensation Practices: An Analysis of Executive Pay at European 
Banks, 64 V AND. L. REv. 431, 476-79 (2011). 
70 See Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 
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forcing only the top executives at large financial firms71 to defer half of all of their 
incentive-based compensation and not requiring any equity compensation. 72 Deferral 
would need to be over at least three years, "with the release of deferred amounts to 
occur no faster than on a pro rata basis." For example, an initial deferral of $150,000 
could be repaid $50,000 per year.73 E.U. regulators have noted the disparity and 
faulted their U.S. counterparts for failing to implement the full FSB model.74 
The U.S. proposal contains a vague requirement that the deferral be adjusted "to 
reflect actual losses or other measures or aspects of performance that are realized or 
become better known during the deferral period."75 The regulators do not specify 
whose performance matters, although presumably it is the entire firm's as deferral 
targets only senior executives. Thus, the requirement seems to support deferral in the 
form of phantom equity, arguably increasing the risk-taking incentives that many 
believe plagues banker pay in the first place. 76 
§ 1B.04 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
Like all of the compensation reforms of the past decades, the post-TARP movement 
to regulate is motivated by the best of intentions. And, as all of the older reforms, we 
should question whether the new movement will be effective or have unintended 
consequences. Throughout this paper, I have questioned whether this movement will 
be able to succeed even on its own terms. Unless firms take compliance to heart and 
change their own internal goals, the flexible standards of the FSB 's Principles would 
do little to slow the aggressive pursuit of risk-financed bonuses. Similarly, the 
mandatory deferrals of the FSB 's Implementation Standards align ultimate payouts to 
individuals with the results of their firms, not their personal results. Moreover, the 
incentive to earn bonuses awards-even by pursuing risky trades-will almost 
certainly swamp any countervailing incentive to protect employers from the remote 
risk of failure. 
So far, however, the criticism is that the post-TARP movement will be ineffective. 
They may, however, tum out to be pathological. Requiring deferral of a fixed 
percentage of bonuses may simply encourage firms to "gross up" their bonuses to 
cover the deferral. Mandatory clawbacks and deferred compensation may also 
complicate the future resolution or bailout of troubled firms. Bankers will be acutely 
71 For this purpose, "large" means a bank having assets of at least $50 billion, the same threshold that 
Dodd-Frank uses in applying the bulk of its important provisions. See id. 
72 See id. 
73 ld. 
74 See Peter Spiegel, EU Warns US to Speed Up Bank Reform, FIN. TIMEs, June 1, 2011. 
75 ld. at 73-74. 
76 See Bebchuk & Spamman, supra note 19. 
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aware that they will suffer large financial losses by going through the new Dodd-Frank 
resolution process. Rather than guiding a troubled firm smoothly into resolution, 
bankers will have every incentive to double down their bets in the hopes that a 
win-even if unlikely-will hold off failure. Conversely, should the Federal Reserve 
and Treasury turn again to bailouts in the future, doing so will almost certainly keep 
executives whole with respect to any deferred compensation. 
It is worth keeping sight of the fact that regulating banker pay works only if it keeps 
firms out of financial distress or insolvency. Were it not for systeriric risk-the 
society-wide costs of distress-regulators would have no reason to bother. For this 
reason, we all may be better off if regulators focus more on the activities and leverage 
of financial firms and less on how they compensate. their employees. 
(Rei. 2011-l0/20ll Pub.l646) 
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